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Abstract
We provide polynomial-time approximately optimal Bayesian mechanisms for makespan min-
imization on unrelated machines as well as for max-min fair allocations of indivisible goods, with
approximation factors of 2 and min{m− k + 1, O˜(
√
k)} respectively, matching the approxima-
tion ratios of best known polynomial-time algorithms (for max-min fairness, the latter claim
is true for certain ratios of the number of goods m to people k). Our mechanisms are ob-
tained by establishing a polynomial-time approximation-sensitive reduction from the problem
of designing approximately optimal mechanisms for some arbitrary objective O to that of de-
signing bi-criterion approximation algorithms for the same objective O plus a linear allocation
cost term. Our reduction is itself enabled by extending the celebrated “equivalence of sepa-
ration and optimization” [26, 31] to also accommodate bi-criterion approximations. Moreover,
to apply the reduction to the specific problems of makespan and max-min fairness we develop
polynomial-time bi-criterion approximation algorithms for makespan minimization with costs
and max-min fairness with costs, adapting the algorithms of [44], [9] and [3] to the type of
bi-criterion approximation that is required by the reduction.
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1 Introduction
Job shop scheduling is a fundamental problem that has been intensively studied in operations
research and computer science in several different flavors. The specific one that we consider in
this paper, called scheduling unrelated machines, pertains to the allocation of m indivisible jobs for
execution to k machines so as to minimize the time needed for the last job to be completed, called the
makespan of the schedule. The input is the processing time pij of each machine i for each job j. The
problem is NP-hard to (3/2−ǫ)-approximate, for any ǫ > 0, but a polynomial-time 2-approximation
algorithm is known [35]. An overview of algorithmic work on this problem can be found in [30].
Starting in the seminal work of Nisan and Ronen [41], scheduling unrelated machines has also
become paradigmatic for investigating the relation between the complexity of mechanism and algo-
rithm design. Mechanism design can be viewed as the task of optimizing an objective over “strategic
inputs.” In comparison to algorithm design where the inputs are known, in mechanism design the
inputs are owned by rational agents who must be incentivized to share enough information about
their input so that the desired objective can be optimized. The question raised by [41] is how much
this extra challenge degrades our ability to optimize objectives:
How much more difficult is mechanism design for a certain objective compared to algorithm
design for that same objective?
In the context of scheduling unrelated machines, suppose that the machines are rational agents who
know their own processing times for the jobs, but want to minimize the sum of processing times
of the jobs assigned to them minus the payment made to them by the mechanism. If the machines
are rational, is it still possible to (approximately) minimize makespan?
Indeed, there are two questions pertaining to the relation of algorithm and mechanism design
that are important to answer. The first is comparing the performance of the optimal mechanism to
that of the optimal algorithm. In our setting, the question is whether there are mechanisms whose
makespan is (approximately) optimal with respect to the real pij’s, which (at least a priori) are
only known to the machines. Nisan and Ronen show that the classical VCG mechanism achieves
a factor k approximation to the optimal makespan [41], but since their work no constant factor
approximation has been obtained. We overview known upper and lower bounds in Section 1.2.
The second question pertaining to the relation of algorithm and mechanism design is of com-
putational nature. The question is whether polynomial-time (approximately) optimal mechanisms
exist for objectives for which polynomial-time (approximately) optimal algorithms exist. In our
context, there exist polynomial-time algorithms whose makespan is approximately optimal with
respect to the optimal makespan of any feasible schedule [35], so the question is whether there exist
polynomial-time mechanisms whose makespan is approximately optimal with respect to that of any
mechanism. This is the question that we study in this paper.
Before proceeding it is worth mentioning that (outside of makespan minimization) this question
has been intensively studied, and the results are discouraging. In particular, a sequence of recent
results [42, 11, 24, 25] have identified welfare maximization problems for which polynomial-time
constant factor approximation algorithms exist, but where no polynomial-time mechanism is better
than a polynomial-factor approximation, subject to well-believed complexity theoretic assumptions.
At the same time, we have also witnessed a recent surge in the study of mechanisms in Bayesian
settings, where the participants of the mechanism (in our case machines) have types (in our case
processing times for jobs) drawn from a prior distribution that is common knowledge. The existence
of priors has been shown [29, 28, 8] to sidestep several intractability results including the ones for
welfare maximization referenced above. In view of this experience, it is natural to ask:
Are there approximately optimal, computationally efficient mechanisms for makespan mini-
mization in Bayesian settings?
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We provide a positive answer to this question, namely (see Theorem 9 for a formal statement)
Informal Theorem 1. In Bayesian settings, there is a polynomial-time 2-approximately optimal
mechanism for makespan minimization for unrelated machines.
In particular, the approximation factor achieved by our mechanism exactly matches the best known
approximation factor achieved by polynomial-time algorithms [35]. In fact, our proof establishes
a polynomial-time, approximation sensitive, black-box reduction from the problem of designing a
mechanism for makespan minimization to the problem of designing a bi-criterion approximation for
the generalized assignment problem [44, 43]. We explain our reduction and the type of bi-criterion
approximation that is required in Section 1.1. We discuss prior work on mechanisms for makespan
minimization in Section 1.2, noting here that the best known approximation factors prior to our
work were polynomial, in general.
A problem related to makespan minimization is that of max-min fair allocation of indivisible
goods, abbreviated to max-min fairness. In the language of job scheduling, this can be described as
looking for an assignment of jobs to machines that maximizes the minimum load—rather than min-
imizing the maximum load, which is the goal in makespan minimization. While the two problems
are related, the best known polynomial-time approximation algorithms for max-min fairness achieve
factors that are polynomial in the number of jobs or machines. We overview algorithmic work on
the problem in Section 1.2, noting here that there are several, mutually undominated approximation
algorithms, whose approximation guarantees have different dependences on the number of jobs m,
machines k, and other parameters of the problem. Our contribution here is to obtain polynomial-
time Bayesian mechanisms matching the approximation factor of some of those algorithms, namely
(see Theorem 10 for a formal statement)
Informal Theorem 2. In Bayesian settings, there are polynomial-time approximately-optimal
mechanisms for max-min fairness whose fairness guarantees are respectively:
1. within a factor of O˜(
√
k) of OPT;
2. within a factor of O(m− k + 1) of OPT.
where OPT is the fairness achieved by the optimal mechanism.
In particular, our approximation guarantees match those of the approximation algorithms provided
by [3] and [9], which both lie on the Pareto boundary of what is achievable by polynomial-time
algorithms. Our contribution here, too, can be viewed as pushing mechanism design up to speed
with algorithm design for the important objective of max-min fairness. Our proof is enabled by a
polynomial-time, approximation sensitive, black-box reduction from mechanism design for max-min
fairness to bi-criterion approximation algorithm design for max-min fairness with allocation costs,
for which we recover approximation guarantees matching those of [3, 9] in Section 4.
Our mechanism to algorithm reduction, enabling Theorems 1 and 2 is discussed next.
1.1 Black-Box Reductions in Mechanism Design
A natural approach towards Theorems 1 and 2 is establishing a polynomial-time reduction from
(approximately) optimizing over mechanisms to (approximately) optimizing over algorithms. This
approach has already been shown fruitful for welfare maximization. Indeed, recent work establishes
such a reduction for welfare maximization in Bayesian settings [29, 28, 8]. Roughly speaking, it is
shown that black-box access to an α-approximation algorithm for an arbitrary welfare maximization
problem can be leveraged to obtain an α-approximately optimal mechanism for the same welfare
maximization problem.
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Unfortunately, recent work has ruled out such black-box reduction for makespan minimiza-
tion [18]. This impossibility result motivated recent work by the authors, where it is shown
that adding a linear allocation cost term to the algorithmic objective can bypass this impossi-
bility [12, 14, 15]. Specifically, it is shown in [15] that finding an (α-approximately) optimal mech-
anism for an arbitrary objective O can be reduced to polynomially many black-box calls to an
(α-approximately) optimal algorithm for the same objective O, perturbed by an additive allocation
cost term.1 This reduction was used to find polynomial-time (approximately) optimal mechanisms
for the important objective of revenue [12, 14] as well as non-linear objectives such as max-min
fairness for divisible goods [15].
On the other hand, adding a (possibly negative) allocation cost term may turn an objective O
that can be (approximately) optimized in polynomial-time into one that cannot be optimized to
within any finite factor. This is precisely what happens if we try to carry out the reduction of [15]
for makespan minimization or max-min fairness with indivisible goods. More precisely:
• To find a polynomial-time α-approximately optimal mechanism for makespan minimization,
the reduction of [15] requires a polynomial-time α-approximately optimal algorithm for the
problem of scheduling unrelated machines with costs. This is similar to scheduling unrelated
machines, except that now it also costs cij (which may be positive, negative, or 0) to assign
job j to machine i, and we are looking for an allocation ~x ∈ {0, 1}km of jobs to machines that
minimizes
M(~x) +
∑
ij
cijxij, (1)
where M(~x) = maxi
∑
j pijxij is the makespan of the allocation ~x. In words, we want to find
a schedule that minimizes the sum of makespan and cost of the allocation. However, it is
easy to see that it is NP-hard to optimize (1) to within any finite factor even when restricted
to instances whose optimum is guaranteed to be positive.2
• Similarly, to find a polynomial-time α-approximately optimal mechanism for max-min fair-
ness, the reduction of [15] requires a polynomial-time α-approximately optimal algorithm for
the problem of max-min fairness with allocation costs. In the notation of the previous bullet,
we are looking for an allocation ~x ∈ {0, 1}km of jobs to machines that maximizes
F (~x) +
∑
ij
cijxij , (2)
where F (~x) = mini
∑
j pijxij is the load of the least loaded machine under allocation ~x.
Again, it is easy to see that it is NP-hard to optimize (2) to within any finite factor.3
1Technically, their result holds for maximization objectives, but our work here provides the necessary modifications
for minimization objectives, as well as the important generalization to (α, β)-approximations discussed below.
2This can be seen via a simple modification of an inapproximability result given in [35]. For the problem of
scheduling unrelated machines, they construct instances with integer-valued makespan that is always ≥ 3 and such
that it is NP-hard to decide whether the makespan is 3 or ≥ 4. We can modify their instances to scheduling unrelated
machines with costs instances by giving each job a cost of z−3
2n+m
on every machine for an arbitrary z > 0. Then the
total cost of any feasible solution is exactly z − 3. So their proof immediately shows that it is NP-hard to determine
if these instances have optimal makespan + cost that is z or ≥ 1+ z. Since z was arbitrary, this shows that no finite
approximation factor is possible.
3Indeed, Bezakova and Dani [9] present a family of max-min fairness instances such that it is NP-hard to distinguish
between OPT ≥ 2 and OPT ≤ 1. To each of these instances add a special machine and a special job such that the
processing-time and cost of the special machine for the special job are 2 and −1 respectively, while the processing-time
and cost of the special machine for any non-special job or of any non-special machine for the special job are 0 and 0
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1.1.1 A single-criterion to bi-criterion approximation-sensitive reduction
The inapproximability results identified above motivate us to develop a novel reduction that is
more robust to adding the allocation cost term to the mechanism design objective. We expect that
our new reduction will reach a much broader family of mechanism design objectives, and indeed
as a corollary of our new reduction we obtain Theorems 1 and 2 for the important objectives of
makespan and max-min fairness, where the reduction of [15] fails.
Our new approach is based on the concept of (α, β)-approximation of objectives modified by
allocation costs, defined in Section 2. Instead of presenting the concept in full generality here, let
us describe it in the context of the makespan minimization objective and its resulting scheduling
unrelated machines with costs problem. For β ≤ 1 ≤ α, we will say that an allocation ~x ∈
{0, 1}km of jobs to machines is an (α, β)-approximation to a scheduling unrelated machines with
costs instance iff
β ·M(~x) +
∑
ij
cijxij ≤ α · min
~x′∈{0,1}km

M(~x′) +∑
ij
cijx
′
ij

 ; (3)
that is, we discount the makespan term in the objective, before comparing to the optimum.
Setting β = 1 in (3) recovers the familiar notion of α-approximation, but taking β < 1 might
make the problem easier. Indeed, we argued earlier that it is NP-hard to achieve any finite α
when β = 1. On the other hand, we can exploit the bi-criterion result of Shmoys and Tardos for
the generalized assignment problem [44] to get a polynomial-time algorithm achieving β = 12 and
α = 1 [44]. The proof of the following proposition is presented in Section 4.
Proposition 1. There is a polynomial-time (1, 12 )-approximation algorithm for scheduling unrelated
machines with (possibly negative) costs.
Given such (α, β)-approximation algorithms for objectives modified by allocation cost, we show
how to obtain (αβ )-approximately optimal mechanisms, by establishing an appropriate mechanism
to algorithm reduction described informally below.
Informal Theorem 3. There is a generic, polynomial-time reduction from the problem of comput-
ing an (αβ )-approximately optimal polynomial-time mechanism for some arbitrary objective O (under
arbitrary feasibility constraints and allowable bidder types) to the problem of (α, β)-approximately
optimizing that same objective O modified by virtual welfare (under the same constraints and al-
lowable bidder types). Whenever the allowable bidder types are additive in the mechanism design
instance, the algorithmic objective becomes O plus a linear allocation cost term.
See Theorem 4 in Section 3 for a formal statement. The main technical challenge in establishing
our reduction is extending the celebrated “equivalence of separation and optimization” [26, 31] to
also accommodate (α, β)-approximations—see Theorem 5. Theorem 1 is obtained by combining
Proposition 1 and Theorem 3.
To apply our mechanism to algorithm reduction to max-min fairness, we need (α, β)-approximation
algorithms for max-min fairness with allocation costs. Since we have a maximization objective, we
are now looking to compute allocations ~x ∈ {0, 1}km such that
β · F (~x) +
∑
ij
cijxij ≥ α · max
~x′∈{0,1}km

F (~x′) +∑
ij
cijx
′
ij

 , (4)
respectively. Also, assign 0 cost to any non-special machine non-special job pair. In the resulting max-min fairness
with costs instances it is NP-hard to distinguish between OPT ≥ 1 and OPT = 0, hence no finite approximation is
possible.
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for some β ≥ 1 ≥ α. In this case, we are allowed to boost the fairness part of the objective before
comparing to α ·OPT. Again, even though no finite α is achievable in polynomial time when β = 1,
we can adapt the algorithms of [3, 9] to obtain finite (α, β)-approximation algorithms for max-min
fairness with costs.
Proposition 2. There is a polynomial-time (12 , O˜(
√
k))-approximation algorithm as well as a
(1, O(m− k + 1))-approximation algorithm for max-min fairness with costs.
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in Section 4. It extends the algorithms of [3, 9] to the presence
of allocation costs, showing that the natural linear programming relaxation can be rounded so
that the cost term does not increase, while the fairness term decreases by a factor of O˜(
√
k) or
O(m− k + 1) respectively. Combining Proposition 2 with Theorem 3 gives Theorem 2.
1.2 Related Work
Makespan minimization and max-min fairness have been extensively studied in both algorithm and
mechanism design settings and numerous different models. It would be impossible to survey all
related literature, but we highlight some results most related to ours below.
Makespan. A long line of work following the seminal paper of Nisan and Ronen [41] addresses
the question of “how much better can the optimal makespan be when compared to the optimal
makespan obtained by a truthful mechanism?” The same paper showed that the answer is at most
a factor of k, and also that the answer is at least 2 for deterministic, dominant strategy truthful,
prior-free mechanisms.4 It was later shown that the answer is at least 1 + φ (the golden ratio)
as k → ∞ [20, 34], and that the answer is in fact k for the restricted class of anonymous mecha-
nisms [4]. It is conjectured that the answer is indeed k for all deterministic, prior-free mechanisms.
Similar (but slightly different) bounds are known for the same question with respect to randomized
prior-free mechanisms [41, 39, 19, 37, 38, 36]. More recently, the same question has been stud-
ied for prior-independent (rather than prior-free) mechanisms [17]. Prior-independent mechanisms
make distributional assumptions about the processing times, but do not use the specifics of the
distributions, just their properties. In particular, when the processing times are drawn from a
machine-symmetric product distribution with Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR) marginals, Chawla,
Hartline, Malec and Sivan show that the answer is at most a factor of O(m/k), and at most a factor
of O(
√
log k), when all processing times are i.i.d. [17]. Without the MHR assumption, they obtain
bicriterion results.5 The question has also been studied in related machines settings, where each job
has a size (public) and each machine has a speed (private). Due to the single-dimensional nature of
the problem, the answer is now exactly a factor of 1 [1]. Thus, focus has shifted towards the same
question for computationally efficient truthful mechanisms, and constant-factor approximations [1]
and PTAS’s [23, 21] are known.
The focus of our work is different than most previous works, in that we do not study the
gap between the algorithmic and the mechanismic optimum. Instead, our focus is computational,
aiming for (approximately) optimal and computationally efficient mechanisms, regardless of how
their performance compares to the performance of optimal algorithms. Still, prior work has already
made some progress on this problem: we know that the VCG mechanism is a computationally
efficient k-approximation [41], and that the mechanisms of [17] provide an approximation ratio of
4A mechanism is called “prior-free” if it does not make any distributional assumption about the processing times
of the machines.
5Specifically, they obtain the same bounds with respect to a different benchmark, namely the optimal expected
makespan using only a fraction of the k machines.
5
O(m/k) when the prior is a machine-symmetric product distribution with MHR marginals, and
a ratio of O(
√
log k) if additionally the marginals are i.i.d. In addition, the NP-hardness result
of [35] implies that our problem is also NP-hard to approximate better than 3/2 − ǫ, for any
ǫ > 0. On this front, our work greatly improves the state-of-the-art as we give the first constant-
factor approximations for unrestricted settings. (The guarantees of [17] are constant in settings
where m = O(k) or k = O(1) and the prior is a machine-symmetric product distribution with
MHR marginals.) Indeed, our approximation guarantee (factor of 2) matches that of the best
polynomial-time algorithm for makespan minimization [35].
Max-Min Fairness. Fair division has been studied extensively in Mathematics and Economics
for over 60 years; see e.g. [45, 33, 10]. Several different flavors of the problem have been studied:
divisible or indivisible goods (in our terminology: jobs), with or without monetary transfers to the
players (in our terminology: machines), and several different notions of fairness. For the allocation
of indivisible goods, virtually all mechanisms proposed in the literature do not optimize max-min
fairness, aiming instead at other fairness guarantees (such as envy-freeness or proportionality), very
commonly trade off value from received items by the players with monetary transfers to or from the
players in the fairness guarantee, and are often susceptible to strategic manipulations. For max-min
fairness, Bezakova and Dani [9] propose a prior-free mechanism for 2 players, which guarantees half
of the optimal fairness, albeit under restrictions on the strategies that the players can use. They
also show that max-min fairness cannot be optimally implemented truthfully in prior-free settings.
In fact, Mualem and Schapira show that no truthful deterministic prior-free mechanism can obtain
any approximation to the optimal max-min fairness [39].
Perhaps the poor state-ot-the-art on mechanisms for max-min fairness owes to the fact that,
already as an algorithmic problem (i.e. even when the players’ true values for the items are assumed
exactly known), max-min fairness has proven quite challenging, indeed significantly more so than
makespan minimization. In particular, all state-of-the-art algorithms only provide polynomial
approximation guarantees [9, 3, 32, 6, 16], while the best known computational hardness result
is just a factor of 2 [9]. Specifically, the guarantees lying on the Pareto boundary of what is
achievable in polynomial time for the unrestricted problem are approximation factors of m− k+ 1
([9]), O˜(
√
k) ([3]), and O(m1/ǫ) ([6, 16]). Due to this, a restricted version of the problem is often
studied, where every job has a fixed processing time pj, and every machine is either capable or
incapable of processing each job (that is, pij ∈ {pj , 0}). For the restricted version, the state of
the art is an O(log log k/ log log log k)-approximation due to Bansal and Sviridenko [5]. Asadpour,
Feige, and Saberi [2] also proved that the integrality gap of the configuration LP used in [5] has
an integrality gap of 5, and provided a heuristic (but not polynomial-time) rounding algorithm.
O(1)-approximations were obtained by Bateni, Charikar and Guruswami and independently by
Chakrabarty, Chuzhoy and Khanna by further restricting the graph structure of which machines
can process which jobs (i.e. by limiting the number of machines that can process each specific job
or requiring that this graph be acyclic) [6, 16].
In view of this literature, our results provide the first approximately optimal mechanisms for
max-min fairness. Indeed, our approximation factors match those of approximation algorithms
on the Pareto boundary of what is achievable in polynomial time [9, 3]. So, in particular, our
mechanisms cannot be strictly improved without progress on the algorithmic front. Obtaining
these mechanisms is already quite involved (see Section 4 and Appendix B), and we leave open
for future investigation the problem of matching the bounds obtained in [6, 16] for the general
problem, [2, 5] for the restricted problem, and [6, 16] for the futher restricted version.
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Black-Box Reductions in Mechanism Design, and Inapproximability. We have already
reviewed several results studying black-box reductions from mechanism to algorithm design. In
fact, the classical VCG mechanism can already be viewed as a mechanism to algorithm reduction
for the important objective of welfare, and Myerson’s celebrated mechanism [40] as a mechanism to
algorithm design reduction, indeed a special case of that in [15], for revenue. We also identified in
Section 1.1 mechanism design objectives for which the reduction results in inapproximable algorith-
mic problems. Indeed, there is a precedence of this phenomenon explored in [27, 7] for the simpler
problem of revenue maximization in single-dimensional settings. In the settings studied by these
papers, the algorithmic problem resulting from the reduction (namely virtual welfare maximiza-
tion) is highly inapproximable. Nevertheless, they side-step this intractability by exploiting the fact
that the algorithmic problem need only be solved well in an average-case sense (in particular, in
expectation over the bidder’s virtual values) rather than on an instance-to-instance basis, as well as
the fact that, in single-dimensional settings, the virtual values have very well-understood structure.
This allows for the design of polynomial-time algorithms that obtain a reasonable approximation
guarantee on average, while possibly performing poorly on some instances. While this approach is
fruitful in single-dimensional settings and the revenue objective, we expect that considerably more
effort is required in order to apply it to multidimensional settings or non-revenue objectives, due to
the lack of structural understanding of virtual values in these settings. Indeed, the revenue max-
imization hardness of approximation result of [15] displays that beyond simple single-dimensional
settings, even average-case approximation algorithms for virtual welfare can be computationally
infeasible.
2 Preliminaries
Our formal setup is a special case of that in [15]. We repeat it here for completeness. Throughout
the preliminaries and entire paper, we state our definitions and results when the goal is to minimize
an objective (such as makespan). Everything extends to maximization objectives (such as fairness)
with the obvious changes (switching ≤ to ≥, min to max, etc.). We often note the required changes.
Mechanism Design Setting. The mechanism designer has a set of feasible outcomes F to choose
from. Each bidder participating in the mechanism may have several possible types. A bidder’s type
determines a value for each possible outcome in F . Specifically, a bidder’s type induces a function
t : F → R. Ti denotes the set of all possible types of bidder i, which we assume to be finite.
Bidder i’s type is drawn from a distribution Di over Ti, which is known to the designer and all
other bidders. Bidder i knows his own type. Bidders are quasi-linear and risk-neutral. That is,
the utility of a bidder of type t for a randomized outcome (distribution over outcomes) X ∈ ∆(F),
when he is charged (a possibly random price with expectation) p, is Ex←X [t(x)] − p. Therefore,
we may extend t to take as input distributions over outcomes as well, with t(X) = Ex←X [t(x)]. A
type profile ~t = (t1, . . . , tk) is a collection of types for each bidder. We assume that the types of the
bidders are independent so that D = ×iDi is the distribution over type profiles.
Mechanisms. A (direct) mechanism consists of two functions, a (possibly randomized) allocation
rule and a (possibly randomized) price rule, and we allow these rules to be correlated. The allocation
rule takes as input a type profile ~t and (possibly randomly) outputs an allocation A(~t) ∈ F . The
price rule takes as input a profile ~t and (possibly randomly) outputs a price vector P (~t). A direct
mechanism invites bidders to report their type to the mechanism, and the bidders may or may not
report their type truthfully. When the profile ~t is reported to the mechanism M = (A,P ), the
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(possibly random) allocation A(~t) is selected and each bidder i is charged the (possibly random)
price Pi(~t). In the definitions below, we discuss the interim allocation rule of a mechanism. This
is a function that takes as input a bidder i and a type ti ∈ Ti and outputs the distribution of
allocations that bidder i sees when reporting type ti over the randomness of the mechanism and
the other bidders’ types, if they report truthfully. Specifically, if the interim allocation rule of
M = (A,P ) is X, then Xi(ti) is a distribution satisfying
Pr[x← Xi(ti)] = E~t−i←D−i
[
Pr[A(ti;~t−i) = x]
]
,
where ~t−i is the vector of types of all bidders but bidder i in ~t, and D−i is the distribution of ~t−i.
Similarly, the interim price rule of the mechanism maps some bidder i and type ti ∈ Ti of that
bidder to the expected price bidder i sees when reporting ti, i.e. pi(ti) = E
[
E~t−i←D−i
[Pi(~t)]
]
.
With these definitions, a mechanism is said to be Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) if it
is in every bidder’s best interest to truthfully report their type to the mechanism, if all other
bidders truthfully report their type. That is, if X, p are the interim allocation and price rules of the
mechanism, then ti(Xi(ti))−pi(ti) ≥ ti(Xi(t′i))−pi(t′i) for all i and ti, t′i ∈ Ti. A mechanism is ǫ-BIC
if each bidder can gain at most an additive ǫ by misreporting their type. That is, ti(Xi(ti))−pi(ti) ≥
ti(Xi(t
′
i))−pi(t′i)−ǫ. In order to make this additive guarantee meaningful, we assume that all types
have been normalized so that ti(X) ∈ [0, 1] for all X ∈ F . A mechanism is said to be Individually
Rational (IR) if it is in every bidder’s best interest to participate in the mechanism, no matter
their type. That is, ti(Xi(ti)) − pi(ti) ≥ 0, for all i, ti ∈ Ti. A mechanism is said to be ex-post IR
if furthermore every bidder receives non-negative utility by telling the truth for every realization
of the other agents’ types and the randomness in the mechanism (and not just in expectation).
Goal of the designer. The designer’s goal is to design a BIC and IR mechanism that minimizes
(or maximizes) the expected value of some objective function, O, when encountering a bidder profile
sampled from D and the bidders report truthfully, which is in their interest to do if the mechanism
is BIC. For simplicity of notation, we restrict our attention in this paper to objective functions O
that take as input a type profile ~t and a randomized outcome X ∈ ∆(F), and output a quantity
O(~t,X) ∈ R+. We say that O is b-bounded if whenever ti(X) ∈ [0, 1] for all i, O(~t,X) ∈ [0, b].
Because our results accommodate an additive ǫ error, we will restrict attention only to O that are
poly(k)-bounded. Note that makespan and fairness are both 1-bounded, and welfare is k-bounded,
so this is not a restrictive assumption.
We also restrict attention to objective functions O such that O(~t,X) = Ex←X [O(~t, x)]. In
other words, O is really just a function of types and outcomes in F , and is extended to random-
ized outcomes in ∆(F) by taking expectations (makespan and fairness are examples of such an
objective).6
Formal Problem Statements. We define the computational problems Bayesian Mechanism
Design (BMeD) and Generalized Objective Optimization Problem (GOOP), which played a cen-
6This is a special case of the setting considered in [15]. We restrict our attention to this case just to simplify
notation, because more generality is not needed for makespan and fairness. However, Theorem 4 applies to objectives
that also depend on the prices charged, as well as objectives that are sensitive to randomness in non-linear ways (but
still must be concave in distributions over outcomes/prices for maximization objectives and convex for minimization
objectives). Note that “deterministic objectives” such as makespan, fairness, welfare, and revenue that are extended
to randomized outcomes by taking expectation behave linearly with respect to randomness and are therefore both
concave and convex in the sense that is relevant for the theorem.
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tral role in [15] and will also play a central role in this paper.7 We state both BMeD and GOOP for
minimization objectives, but both problems are also well-defined for maximization objectives with
the obvious modifications, discussed below. In the following definitions, we denote by V a set of
types (i.e. functions mapping F to R), and by V× the closure of V under addition and scalar mul-
tiplication.
BMeD(F,V,O): Input: For each bidder i ∈ [k], a finite set of types Ti ⊆ V and a distribution
Di over Ti. Goal: Find a feasible (outputs an outcome in F with probability 1), BIC, and IR
mechanismM that minimizes O in expectation, when k bidders with types sampled from D = ×iDi
play M truthfully, where the minimization is with respect to all feasible, BIC, and IR mechanisms.
M is said to be an α-approximation to BMeD if the expected value of O is at most α times the
optimal one.8
GOOP(F, V, O): Input: f ∈ V×, gi ∈ V (1 ≤ i ≤ k), and a multiplier w ≥ 0. Goal: find a
feasible (possibly randomized) outcome X ∈ ∆(F) such that:
(w · O((g1, . . . , gk),X)) + f(X) = min
X′∈F
{(
w · O((g1, . . . , gk),X ′)
)
+ f(X ′)
}
.
We define a bi-criterion notion of approximation for GOOP, saying thatX is an (α, β)-approximation
to GOOP for some β ≤ 1 ≤ α iff:
β (w · O((g1, . . . , gk),X)) + f(X) ≤ α
(
min
X′∈F
{(
w · O((g1, . . . , gk),X ′)
)
+ f(X ′)
})
. (5)
An X satisfying (5) with β = 1 is an α-approximation to GOOP, which is the familiar notion of
approximation for minimization problems. If β < 1, our task becomes easier as the contribution of
the O part to the objective we are looking to minimize is discounted.
Within the context of our reduction from BMeD to GOOP, as well as that of previous reductions,
one should interpret the function f in the GOOP instance as representing virtual welfare, and each
gi as representing the type reported by agent i.
Remark 1. For maximization objectives O, we replace min by max in the definition of GOOP,
and we invert the direction of the inequality in (5). Moreover, the feasible range of parameters for
an (α, β)-approximation are now α ≤ 1 ≤ β.
Scheduling Unrelated Machines with Costs. There are k machines and m indivisible jobs.
Each machine i can process job j in time pij ≥ 0. Additionally, processing job j on machine i costs
cij units of currency, where cij is unrestricted and in particular could be negative. An assignment
of jobs to machines is a km-dimensional vector ~x such that xij ∈ {0, 1}, for all i and j, where job
j is assigned to machine i iff xij = 1. We denote by M(~x) = maxi{
∑
j xijpij} the makespan of an
assignment, by F (~x) = mini{
∑
j xijpij} the fairness of an assignment, and by C(~x) =
∑
i
∑
j xijcij
the cost of an assignment. In the makespan minimization problem, an assignment is valid iff∑
i xij = 1 for all jobs j, while in the fairness maximization problem, an assignment is valid iff∑
i xij ≤ 1. To avoid carrying these constraints around, we use the convention that M(~x) =∞, if∑
i xij 6= 1 for some j, and F (~x) = −∞, if
∑
i xij > 1 for some j. It will also be useful for analysis
purposes to consider fractional assignments of jobs, which relax the constraints xij ∈ {0, 1} to
7These problems were named MDMDP (Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design Problem) and 2-SADP (Solve-Any
Differences Problem) in [15]. We change their names here for a more accurate description of the problems.
8By “find a mechanism” we formally mean “output a computational device that will take as input a profile of
types ~t and output (possibly randomly) an outcome in F and a price to charge each agent.” The runtime of this
device is of course relevant, and will be addressed in our formal theorem statements.
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xij ∈ [0, 1]. This corresponds to assigning an xij-fraction of job j to machine i for all pairs (i, j).
Notice that M(~x), F (~x) and C(~x) are still well-defined for fractional assignments.
The goal of makespan minimization with costs is to find an assignment ~x ∈ {0, 1}km satisfying
M(~x) + C(~x) = min~x′∈{0,1}km{M(~x′) + C(~x′)}. In the language of GOOP, this is GOOP({0, 1}km,
{additive functions with non-negative coefficients}, M). The processing times ~pi correspond to the
functions gi that are input to GOOP, and the costs ~c corresponds to the function f . For α ≥ 1 ≥ β,
an (α, β)-approximation for this problem is an assignment ~x ∈ {0, 1}km with βM(~x) + C(~x) ≤
αmin~x′∈{0,1}km{M(~x′) +C(~x′)}.
The goal of fairness maximization with costs is to find an assignment ~x ∈ {0, 1}km satisfying
F (~x) + C(~x) = max~x′∈{0,1}km{F (~x′) + C(~x′)}. In the language of GOOP, this is GOOP({0, 1}km,
{additive functions with non-negative coefficients}, F ). Again, the processing times ~pi correspond
to the functions gi that are input to GOOP, and the costs ~c corresponds to the function f . For
α ≤ 1 ≤ β, an (α, β)-approximation for this problem is an assignment ~x ∈ {0, 1}km with βF (~x) +
C(~x) ≥ αmax~x′∈{0,1}km{F (~x′) +C(~x′)}.
Note that in the case of maximizing fairness, sometimes the jobs are thought of as gifts and
the machines are thought of as children (and the problem is called the Santa Claus problem). In
this case, it makes sense to think of the children as having value for the gifts (and preferring more
value to less value) instead of the machines having processing time for jobs (and preferring less
processing time to more). For ease of exposition, we will stick to the jobs/machines interpretation,
although our results extend to the gifts/children interpretation as well.
Implicit Forms. For any feasible mechanism M = (A,P ) for a BMeD(F ,V,O) instance, we
define (as in [15]) the three components of its implicit form ~πMI = (O
M , ~πM , ~pM ) as follows.
• OM = E~t←D[O(~t,A(~t))]. That is, OM is the expected value of O when agents sampled from
D play mechanism M .
• For all agents i and types t, t′ ∈ Ti, πMi (t, t′) = E~t−i←D−i[t(A(t′,~t−i))]. That is, πMi (t, t′) is the
expected value of agent i with real type t from reporting type t′ to the mechanism M . The
expectation is taken over any randomness in M as well as the other agents’ types, assuming
they are sampled from D−i.
• For all agents i and types t ∈ Ti, pMi (t) = E~t−i←D−i[Pi(t,~t−i)]. That is, pMi (t) is the expected
price paid by agent i when reporting type t to the mechanism M . The expectation is taken
over any randomness inM as well as the other agents’ types, assuming they are sampled from
D−i.
We can also talk about implicit forms separately from mechanisms, and call any (1+
∑
i |Ti|2+∑
i |Ti|)-dimensional vector an implicit form. We say that an implicit form ~πI = (O,~π, ~p) is feasible
for a specific BMeD(F ,V,O) instance if there exists a feasible mechanism M for that instance
such that O ≥ OM , ~π = ~πM , and ~p = ~pM . We say that the mechanism M implements the implicit
form ~πI when these inequalities hold. For maximization objectives, we instead constrain O ≤ OM .9
We denote by F (F ,D,O) the set of all feasible implicit forms (with respect to a specific instance
of BMeD(F ,V,O)). It is shown in [15] that F (F ,D,O) is a convex set.
9The relaxations O ≥ OM , for minimization, and O ≤ OM , for maximization objectives, instead of O = OM , is
required for technical reasons.
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3 BMeD and Approximation
The goal of this section is to prove the following theorem, generalizing Theorem 4 of [15] to ac-
commodate both (α, β)-approximations and minimization objectives. Informally, Theorem 4 states
that there is a polynomial-time black box reduction from (αβ )-approximating BMeD(F ,V,O) to
(α, β)-approximating GOOP(F ,V,O). Theorem 4 of [15] is a special case of our theorem here for
maximization objectives and (α, 1)-approximations. Throughout this section, we will use b to rep-
resent an upper bound on maxi{|Ti|} and the bit complexity of O(~t,X), Pr[ti], and ti(X), for all
i, ti ∈ Ti,X ∈ F for the given BMeD(F ,V,O) instance. We will also use the notation rtG(x) to
denote an upper bound on the running time of algorithm G on input of bit complexity x.
Theorem 4. Let G be an (α, β)-approximation algorithm for GOOP(F ,V,O), for some α ≥
1 ≥ β > 0, and some minimization objective O. Also, fix any ǫ > 0. Then there is an ap-
proximation algorithm for BMeD(F ,V,O) that makes poly(b, k, 1/ǫ) calls to G, and runs in time
poly(b, k, 1/ǫ, rtG(poly(b, k, 1/ǫ))). If OPT is the optimal obtainable expected value of O for some
BMeD instance, then the mechanism M output by the algorithm on that instance yields E[O(M)] ≤
α
βOPT+ǫ, and is ǫ-BIC. These guarantees hold with probability at least 1−exp(poly(b, k, 1/ǫ)). Fur-
thermore, the output mechanism is feasible, ex-post individually rational, and can be implemented
in time poly(b, k, 1/ǫ, rtG(poly(b, k, 1/ǫ))). These guarantees hold with probability 1.
Remark 2. Note that Theorem 4 extends to accommodate maximization problems as well. Here
α ≤ 1 ≤ β, and the guarantee becomes E[O(M)] ≥ αβOPT − ǫ. Theorem 4 also extends to settings
where O is a function of prices charged (such as revenue) and should be written as O(~t,X, ~P ),
as well as settings where the prices charged affect whether or not a mechanism is feasible (such
as simultaneously respecting budgets and individual rationality ex-post), as well as settings where
O behaves in a non-linear but convex (concave for maximization problems) way with respect to
randomness (such as fractional fairness).
There are two key techniques in proving Theorem 4. The first is establishing an approximation
preserving version of the celebrated “equivalence of separation and optimization” [26, 31] that can
accommodate (α, β)-approximations, summarized in Section 3.1 below. The second is understand-
ing how to get mileage out of this improved equivalence within the framework of [15], summarized
in Section 3.2.
3.1 (α, β)-approximate Equivalence of Separation and Optimization
In this section we state and prove an extension of the “equivalence of separation and optimization”
that accommodates (α, β)-approximations. Let us first define what (α, β)-approximations are for
linear optimization problems. In the definition below, α and β are constants and S is a subset of
the coordinates. When we write the vector (c~xS , ~x−S), we mean the vector ~x where all coordinates
in S have been multiplied by c.
Definition 1. An algorithm A is an (α, β, S)-minimization algorithm for polytope P iff for any
input vector ~w the vector A(~w) output by the algorithm satisfies:
(βA(~w)S ,A(~w)−S) · ~w ≤ αmin
~x∈P
{~x · ~w}. (6)
Given such algorithm, we also define the algorithm AβS that outputs (βA(~w)S ,A(~w)−S).10
10We can similarly define the concept of a (α, β, S)-maximization algorithm for polytope P by flipping the inequality
in (6) and also switching min to max.
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Taking β = 1 recovers the familiar notion of α-approximation, except that we do not require the
output of the algorithm to lie in P in our definition. (Most meaningful applications of our framework
will enforce this extra property though.) With β < 1 (respectively β > 1), the minimization (resp.
maximization) becomes easier as the coordinates indexed by S are discounted (boosted) by a factor
of β before comparing to α ·OPT .
Our next theorem states that an (α, β, S)-approximation algorithm for polytope P can be used
to obtain a “weird” separation oracle (WSO) for αP (by αP we mean the polytope P blown up
by a factor of α or shrunk by a factor of α, depending on whether α ≥ 1 or α ≤ 1), a concept
explained in the statement of our theorem, which generalizes weird separation oracles from [14].
We state and prove our theorem for (α, β, S)-minimization algorithms, but the theorem holds for
maximization by switching min to max and reversing the inequality in Property 4, and the proof is
essentially identical. A complete proof of Theorem 5 can be found in Appendix A. Before stating
the theorem formally, let’s overview quickly what each property below is guaranteeing. Property 1
guarantees that the WSO is consistent at least with respect to points inside αP (but may behave
erratically outside of αP ). Property 2 guarantees that even though the points accepted by WSO
may not be in αP (or even in P ), they will at least satisfy some relaxed notion of feasibility.
Property 3 guarantees that WSO terminates in polynomial time. Property 4 guarantees that if we
run Ellipsoid withWSO instead of a real separation oracle for αP , that we don’t sacrifice anything
in terms of optimality (although the output is only guaranteed to satisfy the notion of feasibility
given in Property 2. It may be infeasible in the traditional sense, i.e. not contained in αP ).
Theorem 5. Let P be a convex region in Rd and A an (α, β, S)-minimization algorithm for P , for
some α, β > 0. Then we can design a “weird” separation oracle WSO for αP with the following
properties:
1. Every halfspace output by WSO will contain αP .
2. Whenever WSO(~x) = “yes” for some input ~x, the execution of WSO explicitly finds direc-
tions ~w1, . . . , ~wd+1 such that ~x ∈ Conv{AβS(~w1), . . . ,AβS(~wd+1)}, and therefore ( 1β~xS, ~x−S) ∈
Conv{A(~w1), . . . ,A(~wd+1)} as well.
3. Let b be the bit complexity of ~x, ℓ an upper bound on the bit complexity of A(~w) for all
~w ∈ [−1, 1]d. Then on input ~x, WSO terminates in time poly(d, b, ℓ, rtA(poly(d, b, ℓ))) and
makes at most poly(d, b, ℓ) queries to A.
4. Let Q be an arbitrary convex region in Rd described via some separation oracle, ~c a linear
objective with ~c−S = ~0, and OPT = min~y∈αP∩Q{~c ·~y}. Let also ~z be the output of the Ellipsoid
algorithm for minimizing ~c · ~y over ~y ∈ αP ∩ Q, but using WSO as a separation oracle for
αP instead of a standard separation oracle for αP (i.e. use the exact same parameters for
Ellipsoid as if WSO was a valid separation oracle for αP , and still use a standard separation
oracle for Q). Then ~c · ~z ≤ OPT , and therefore ~c · ( 1β~zS , ~z−S) ≤ 1βOPT .
3.2 Finding and Implementing Approximate Solutions to BMeD
In this section, we show how to make use of the techniques developed in Section 3.1 to obtain
approximate solutions to BMeD instances from (α, β)-approximation algorithms for their corre-
sponding GOOP instances. Essentially, the process breaks down into two parts: First, we solve a
linear program to find an implicit form ~πI whose O component is at most αOPT + ǫ (or at least
αOPT − ǫ for maximization). Second, we must actually implement ~πI efficiently as a mechanism
(recall that a mechanism takes as input a type profile ~t then selects a feasible outcome and charges
prices). So ideally, ~πI should be feasible (in all previous works [12, 13, 14, 15], this was the case).
But with access only to an (α, β)-approximation algorithm, obtaining an implicit form that is both
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feasible and within an α-factor of OPT simply isn’t possible. We show instead that the guarantees
of Theorem 5 allow us to approximately implement ~πI , losing only an additional factor of β in the
objective. We proceed to give more detail.
We start by writing a linear program (included as Figure 2 in Appendix A) whose variables
are components of an implicit form to find the truthful, feasible implicit form that optimizes O. A
polynomial number of linear constraints enforce that the implicit form is truthful, but a separation
oracle is required to enforce ~πI ∈ F (F ,D,O). Unfortunately, such a separation oracle can’t be
obtained efficiently, so we approximate F (F ,D,O) with another polytope for which we can obtain
a separation oracle. Specifically, we define D′ to be the uniform distribution over polynomially
many samples (in b, k and 1/ǫ) from D, and approximate F (F ,D,O) with F (F ,D′,O).11 The
following proposition from [15] states this formally.
Proposition 3. ([13],[15]) With probability at least 1 − exp(poly(b, k, 1/ǫ)), for every feasible
mechanism M , the implicit form of M with respect to D (~πM ∈ F (F ,D,O)), and with respect to
D′ (~πM0 ∈ F (F ,D′,O)) are ǫ-close. That is, |~πM − ~πM0 |1 ≤ ǫ.
From here, we can replace F (F ,D,O) with F (F ,D′,O) to obtain the Linear Program in Figure 3
in Appendix A, and reduce the problem of solving this linear program and finding an approximately
optimal implicit form to designing a weird separation oracle for F (F ,D′,O), using Theorem 5. Our
progress so far is summarized in Proposition 4. Note that, during the execution of the Ellipsoid
algorithm referred to in the statement of the proposition, we will also be recording the auxiliary
information produced by the weird separation oracle, as guaranteed by Property 2 of Theorem 5.
Proposition 4. With black-box access to an (α, β, {O})-optimization algorithm, A, for F (F ,D′,O),
we can use the weird separation oracle of Theorem 5 to run the Ellipsoid algorithm on the linear
program of Figure 3. The Ellipsoid algorithm will run in time poly(b, k, 1/ǫ, rtA(poly(b, k, 1/ǫ))),
and will output a truthful implicit form ~πI . With probability at least 1 − exp(poly(b, k, 1/ǫ)), the
objective component O of ~πI will satisfy O ≤ αOPT + ǫ, where OPT is the expected value of
O in the optimal truthful mechanism. Furthermore, the algorithm will explicitly output a list of
d+ 1 = poly(b, k) directions ~w1, . . . , ~wd+1 such that ~πI ∈ Conv{Aβ{O}(~w1), . . . ,Aβ{O}(~wd+1)}.
Next, we show that one can obtain an (α, β, {O})-optimization algorithm for F (F ,D′,O) given
black-box access to an (α, β)-approximation algorithm for GOOP (F ,V,O). The proof is included
in Appendix A.
Proposition 5. Let all types in the support of D (and therefore D′ as well) be in the set V.
Then with black-box access to G, an (α, β)-approximation algorithm for GOOP (F ,V,O), one can
obtain an (α, β, {O})-optimization algorithm, A, for F (F ,D′,O). The algorithm runs in time
polynomial in b, k, 1/ǫ, and rtG(poly(b, k, 1/ǫ)). Furthermore, given as input any direction ~w, one
can implement in time poly(b, k, 1/ǫ, rtG(poly(b, k, 1/ǫ))) a feasible mechanism M whose implicit
form with respect to D′, ~πM0 , satisfies ~πM0 = A(~w).
Taken together, the above propositions provide an algorithm to find an implicit form ~πI whose
objective component is within an α-factor of optimal. The only remaining step is to implement it.
As mentioned earlier, there’s a bit of a catch here because ~πI may not even be feasible. We instead
approximately implement ~πI , losing a factor of β in the objective component but leaving the others
untouched.
11Technically, the sampling procedure used to generate the support of D′ is slightly more involved, but we omit
the details here because the distinction is not important. We refer the reader to [13] for more details.
13
Proposition 6. Let ~πI = (O,~π, ~p) be the implicit form and ~w1, . . . , ~wd+1 the auxiliary information
output by the algorithm of Proposition 4, when using some (α, β)-approximation algorithm G for
GOOP (F ,V,O) in order to get the required (α, β, {O})-optimization algorithm for F (F ,D′,O),
via Proposition 5. Then one can implement an ex-post individually rational mechanism M in time
polynomial in d and rtG(poly(b, k, 1/ǫ)). With probability 1− exp(poly(b, k, 1/ǫ)), M satisfies:
• |OM −O/β| ≤ ǫ.
• |~π − ~πM |1 ≤ ǫ.
• |~p− ~pM |1 ≤ ǫ.
The proof of Proposition 6 is also included in Appendix A. Combining Propositions 4 through 6
proves Theorem 4. We formally show this in Appendix A for completeness.
4 Makespan and Fairness
In this section we state bicriterion algorithmic results for minimizing makespan and maximizing
fairness, as well as their implications to mechanism design. Additionally, we state a general theorem
that is useful in developing (α, β)-approximation algorithms via algorithms that round fractional
solutions. In particular, this theorem allows us to get a (12 , O˜(
√
k))-approximation for fairness based
on the algorithm of Asadpour and Saberi [3]. We begin by stating our (α, β)-guarantees.
Theorem 6. There is a polynomial-time (1, 12)-approximation for minimizing makespan with costs
on unrelated machines. The algorithm is based on a rounding theorem of Shmoys and Tardos [44].
Theorem 7. There is a polynomial-time algorithm for maximizing fairness with costs on unrelated
machines with the following guarantees:
• A (12 , O˜(
√
k))-approximation based on an algorithm of Asadpour and Saberi [3].
• A (1,m − k + 1)-approximation based on an algorithm of Bezakova and Dani [9].
Next, we state a theorem useful in the analysis of algorithms that round fractional solutions. In
the theorem statement below, ~x ∈ [0, 1]km denotes a fractional assignment of jobs to machines, and
~y denotes a randomly sampled assignment in {0, 1}km according to some rounding procedure. Note
that when we write F (~y), we mean the expected value of the random variable F (~y), and not the
fairness computed with respect to the fractional assignment E[yij]. Finally, ~v ∈ {0, 1}km denotes
the integral allocation that maximizes C(~w) over all ~w ∈ {0, 1}km. In other words, ~v assigns each
job to the machine with the highest non-negative cost, if one exists (and nowhere if none exists).
We emphasize again that Theorem 8 is what enables the first bullet in Theorem 7 above, and will
likely have applications to the analysis of other potential (α, β)-approximation algorithms. We also
note that Theorem 8 applies to any maximization objective, not just fairness.
Theorem 8. Let ~x ∈ [0, 1]km be a fractional assignment of jobs to machines that is an (α, β)-
approximation with respect to the optimal integral assignment (that is, βF (~x) + C(~x) ≥ αOPT ),
and ~y a random variable of assignments supported on {0, 1}km satisfying z ·F (~y) ≥ F (~x), for some
z ≥ 1, and E[yij] ≤ xij for all i, j. Then for any γ ∈ [0, 1], at least one of the following is true:
• z · βF (~y) + C(~y) ≥ γ(βF (~x) + C(~x)) ≥ γ · αOPT . That is, ~y is a (γα, zβ)-approximation.
• Or F (~v) + C(~v) ≥ (1 − γ)(βF (~x) + C(~x)) ≥ (1 − γ) · αOPT . That is, ~v is a ((1 − γ)α, 1)-
approximation. ~v is the assignment maximizing C(~w) over all feasible ~w ∈ {0, 1}km.
Proofs of Theorems 6, 7, and 8 can be found in Appendix B. We conclude this section by stating
formally our results on truthful mechanisms for scheduling on unrelated machines. Theorems 9
and 10 are direct corollaries of Theorem 4 combined with Theorems 6 and 7.
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Theorem 9. There is a polynomial-time 2-approximation algorithm for truthfully minimizing
makespan on unrelated machines (formally the problem BMeD({0, 1}km , {additive functions with
coefficients pij ∈ [0, 1]}, Makespan). For any desired ǫ > 0, the output mechanism is ǫ-BIC, and
has expected makespan at most 2OPT + ǫ with probability at least 1− exp(poly(b, k,m, 1/ǫ)). Fur-
thermore, the output mechanism is feasible, can be implemented in time poly(b, k,m, 1/ǫ), and is
ex-post individually rational with probability 1. The runtime of the algorithm is poly(b, k,m, 1/ǫ).
Theorem 10. There is a polynomial-time min{O˜(
√
k),m − k + 1}-approximation algorithm for
truthfully maximizing fairness on unrelated machines (formally the problem BMeD({0, 1}km, {additive
functions with coefficients pij ∈ [0, 1]}, Fairness). For any desired ǫ > 0, the output mechanism is
ǫ-BIC, and has expected fairness at least min{O˜(√k),m− k + 1}OPT + ǫ with probability at least
1 − exp(poly(b, k,m, 1/ǫ)). Furthermore, the output mechanism is feasible, can be implemented in
time poly(b, k,m, 1/ǫ), and is ex-post individually rational with probability 1. The runtime of the
algorithm is poly(b, k,m, 1/ǫ).
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A Proof of Theorems 4 and 5
A.1 Proof of Theorem 5
Here we prove Theorem 5 for minimization algorithms, noting that the proof for maximization
algorithms is nearly identical after switching ≤ for ≥ and min for max where appropriate. Much
of the proof is similar to that of Theorem H.1 in [14]. We include it here for completeness, however
we refer the reader to [14] for the proof of some technical lemmas. We begin by defining the weird
separation oracle in Figure 1. This is identical to the weird separation oracle used in [14], except
that we use AβS instead of just A.
WSO(~y) =
• “Yes” if the ellipsoid algorithm with N iterationsa outputs “infeasible” on the following
problem:
variables: ~w, t;
constraints:
– ~w ∈ [−1, 1]d;
– t ≥ ~y · ~w + δ;b
– ŴSO(~w, t) =
∗ “yes” if t ≤ AβS(~w) · ~w;c
∗ the violated hyperplane t′ ≤ AβS(~w) · ~w′ otherwise.
• If a feasible point (t∗, ~w∗) is found, output the violated hyperplane ~w∗ · ~x ≤ t∗.
aThe appropriate choice of N for our use of WSO is provided in Corollary 5.1 of Section 5 in [15]. N is polynomial
in the appropriate quanitites.
bThe appropriate choice of δ for our use ofWSO is provided in Lemma 5.1 of Section 5 in [14]. The bit complexity
of δ is polynomial in the appropriate quantities.
cNotice that the set {(~w, t)|ŴSO(~w, t) = “Yes”} is not necessarily convex or even connected.
Figure 1: A “weird” separation oracle.
Lemma 1. If AβS is an (α, β, S)-minimization algorithm for the polytope P , then every halfspace
output by WSO contains αP .
18
Proof. If WSO outputs a halfspace (~w∗, t∗), then we must have ŴSO(~w∗, t∗) = “yes”, implying
that t∗ ≤ AβS(~w∗) · ~w∗. Because A is an (α, β, S)-approximation, we know that AβS(~w∗) · ~w∗ ≤
αmin~x∈P {~x · ~w∗} = min~x∈αP {~x · ~w∗}. Therefore, every ~x ∈ αP satisfies t∗ ≤ ~w∗ · ~x, and the
halfspace contains αP .
Lemma 2. Let b be the bit complexity of ~y, ℓ an upper bound on the bit complexity of AβS(~w) for all
~w ∈ [−1, 1]d. Then on input ~y, WSO terminates in time poly(d, b, ℓ, rtA(poly(d, b, ℓ))) and makes
at most poly(d, b, ℓ) queries to A.
Proof. It is clear that ŴSO is queried at most poly(N, d, b, ℓ,BC(δ)) times, where BC(δ) is the
bit complexity of δ. Each execution of ŴSO makes one call to A. So as long as N and the bit
complexity of δ are both polynomial in poly(d, b, ℓ), the lemma holds. This is shown in Corollary 5.1
of Section 5 and Lemma 5.1 of Section 5 in [14], and we omit further details here.
Lemma 3. Let Q be an arbitrary convex region in Rd described via some separation oracle, and
OPT = min~y∈αP∩Q{~c · ~y} for some vector ~c. Let also ~z be the output of the Ellipsoid algorithm
for minimizing ~c · ~y over ~y ∈ αP ∩ Q, but using WSO as a separation oracle for αP instead of
a standard separation oracle (i.e. use the exact parameters for Ellipsoid as if WSO was a valid
separation oracle for αP , and still use a standard separation oracle for Q). Then ~z · ~c ≤ OPT .
Proof. When the Ellipsoid algorithm tries to minimize ~c · ~x, it does a binary search over possible
values C, and checks whether or not there is a point ~x satisfying ~x ·~c ≤ C, ~x ∈ Q, and WSO(~x) =
“yes”. If there is a point ~x satisfying ~x · ~c ≤ C, ~x ∈ Q, and ~x ∈ αP , then clearly every halfspace
output by the separation oracle for Q contains ~x, and so does the halfspace ~y ·~c ≤ C. Furthermore,
by Lemma 1, every halfspace output by WSO contains ~x as well. Therefore, if OPT ≤ C, the
Ellipsoid algorithm usingWSO will find a feasible point and continue its binary search. Therefore,
the algorithm must conclude with a point ~z satisfying ~z · ~c ≤ OPT .
Lemma 4. Whenever WSO(~y) = “yes” for some input ~y, the execution of WSO explicitly finds
directions ~w1, . . . , ~wd+1 such that ~y ∈ Conv{AβS(~w1), . . . ,AβS(~wd+1)}.
Proof. Consider the following intersection of halfspaces:
t′ ≥ ~y · ~w′ + δ
t′ ≤ AβS(~w) · ~w′, ∀~w ∈W
~w′ ∈ [−1, 1]d
If ~y /∈ Conv({AβS(~w)|~w ∈ W}), there exists some weight vector ~w∗ ∈ [−1, 1]d such that ~y ·
~w∗ < min~w∈W{AβS(~w) · ~w∗}. And for appropriately chosen δ = 2−poly(d,b,ℓ), we also have ~y · ~w∗ ≤
min~w∈W {AβS(~w) · ~w∗} − δ.
So if ~y /∈ Conv({AβS(~w)|~w ∈ W}), consider the point ~w∗, t∗, with t∗ = min~w∈W {AβS(~w) · ~w∗}.
By the reasoning in the previous paragraph, it’s clear that (~w∗, t∗) is in the above intersection of
halfspaces.
So consider an execution of WSO that accepts the point ~y. Then taking W to be the set
of directions ~w queried by the Ellipsoid algorithm during the execution of WSO, the Ellipsoid
algorithm deemed the intersection of halfspaces above to be empty. This necessarily means that
~y ∈ Conv({AβS(~w)|~w ∈W}), as otherwise the previous paragraphs prove that the above intersection
of halfspaces wouldn’t be empty.
So we may take ~w1, . . . , ~wd+1 to be (an appropriately chosen subset of) the directions queried
by the Ellipsoid algorithm during the execution of WSO and complete the proof of the lemma.
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It is clear that each lemma proves one guarantee of Theorem 5, completing the proof.
A.2 Theorem 4
We begin by stating the linear program used in our algorithm in Figure 2, and it’s modification to
use F (F ,D′,O) instead in Figure 3 (both taken directly from [15]).
Variables:
• πi(t, t′), for all bidders i and types t, t′ ∈ Ti, denoting the expected value obtained by bidder
i when their true type is t but they report t′ instead.
• pi(t), for all bidders i and types t ∈ Ti, denoting the expected price paid by bidder i when
they report type t.
• O, denoting the expected value of O.
Constraints:
• πi(t, t) − pi(t) ≥ πi(t, t′) − pi(t′), for all bidders i, and types t, t′ ∈ Ti, guaranteeing that the
implicit form (O,~π, ~p) is BIC.
• πi(t, t) − pi(t) ≥ 0, for all bidders i, and types t ∈ Ti, guaranteeing that the implicit form
(O,~π, ~p) is individually rational.
• (O,~π) ∈ F (F ,D,O), guaranteeing that the implicit form (O,~π, ~p) is feasible.
Minimizing:
• O, the expected value of O when played truthfully by bidders sampled from D.
Figure 2: A linear programming formulation for BMeD.
Observation 1. ([15]) Any solution to the linear program of Figure 2 is the implicit form of a
feasible, BIC, IR mechanism that achieves the optimal expected value of O.
We now proceed by proving Propositions 4 through 6.
Proof of Proposition 4: Theorem 5 guarantees that the linear program can be solved in the desired
runtime, and that the desired directions ~w1, . . . , ~wd+1 will be output. It is clear that any implicit
form satisfying the constraints is truthful.
Let now OPT ′ denote the value of the LP in Figure 3, OPTα denote the value of the LP
in Figure 2 using a real separation oracle for αF (F ,D,O), and OPT ′α denote the value of the
LP in Figure 3 using a real separation oracle for αF (F ,D′,O). Theorem 5 also guarantees that
O ≤ OPT ′α. So we just need to show that OPT ′α ≤ αOPT + ǫ with the desired probability.
To see this, first observe that the origin satisfies every constraint in the linear program not due
to F (F ,D′,O) (i.e. the truthfulness constraints) with equality. Therefore, if any implicit form ~πI
is truthful, so is the implicit form α~πI . This immediately implies that OPTα = αOPT .
By Proposition 3, we know that with the desired probability, the implicit form (with respect
to D) of whatever mechanism implements ~πI (with respect to D′) is ǫ-close to ~πI , and therefore
OPT ′α ≤ OPTα + ǫ = αOPT + ǫ with the desired probability as well. ✷
In order to prove Proposition 5, we make use of a technical lemma from [15] (specifically,
combining Propositions 1 and 7).
Proposition 7. ([15]) Let ~w be a direction in [−1, 1]1+
∑
i
(|Ti|2+|Ti|). Define the virtual objective
O′~w as:
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Variables:
• πi(t, t′), for all bidders i and types t, t′ ∈ Ti, denoting the expected value obtained by bidder
i when their true type is t but they report t′ instead.
• pi(t), for all bidders i and types t ∈ Ti, denoting the expected price paid by bidder i when
they report type t.
• O, denoting the expected value of O.
Constraints:
• πi(t, t) − pi(t) ≥ πi(t, t′) − pi(t′), for all bidders i, and types t, t′ ∈ Ti, guaranteeing that the
implicit form (O,~π, ~p) is BIC.
• πi(t, t) − pi(t) ≥ 0, for all bidders i, and types t ∈ Ti, guaranteeing that the implicit form
(O,~π, ~p) is individually rational.
• (O,~π) ∈ F (F ,D′,O), guaranteeing that the implicit form (O,~π, ~p) is (almost) feasible.
Minimizing:
• O, (almost) the expected value of O when played truthfully by bidders sampled from D.
Figure 3: An ǫ-approximate linear programming formulation for BMeD.
O′~w(~t′,X) = wO · O(~t′,X) +
∑
i
∑
t∈Ti
wi(t, t
′)
Pr[t′]
· t(X)
Then for any mechanism M = (A,P ), if ~πMI denotes the implicit form of M with respect to D,
~πMI · ~w is exactly the expected virtual objective of M on type profiles sampled from D. Formally:
~πMI · ~w = E~t′←D[O′~w(~t′, A(~t′))]
Proof of Proposition 5: Let’s first consider the case that wO ≥ 0. The wO < 0 case will be handled
with one technical modification. Consider first that for any fixed ~t′, the problem of finding X that
minimizes O′~w(~t′,X) is an instance of GOOP (F ,V,O). Simply let w = wO, f =
∑
i
∑
t∈Ti
wi(t,t
′)
Pr[t′] ·
t(·), and gi = t′i(·).
So with black-box access to an (α, β)-approximation algorithm, G, for GOOP (F ,V,O), letM =
(A,P ) be the mechanism that on profile ~t′ simply runs G on input w = wO, f =
∑
i
∑
t∈Ti
wi(t,t
′)
Pr[t′] ·
t(·), ~g = ~t′. We therefore get that the mechanism M satisfies the following inequality:
E~t′←D′ [β·wO·O(~t′, A(~t′))+
∑
i
∑
t∈Ti
wi(t, t
′)
Pr[t′]
·t(A(~t′))] ≤ αE~t′←D′[ minX′∈F{wO·O(
~t′,X ′)+
∑
i
∑
t∈Ti
wi(t, t
′)
Pr[t′]
·t(X ′))}]
By Proposition 7, this then implies that:
(βOM , ~πM , ~pM ) · ~w ≤ α min
~x∈F (F ,D′,O)
{~x · ~w}
This exactly states that ~πM0 is an (α, β,O)-approximation. It is also clear that we can compute
~πM0 efficiently: D′ has polynomially many profiles in its support, so we can just run A on every
profile and see what it outputs, then take an expectation to compute the necessary quantities of
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the implicit form. Note that this computation is the reason we bother using D′ at all, as we cannot
compute these expectations exactly in polynomial time for D as the support is exponential.
Now we state the technical modification to accommodate wO < 0. Recall that for any feasible
implicit form (O,~π, ~p), that the implicit form (O′, ~π, ~p) is also feasible for any O′ ≥ O. So if
wO < 0, simply find any feasible implicit form, then set the O component to ∞. This yields a
feasible implicit form with ~πI · ~w = −∞, which is clearly an (α, β,O)-approximation (in fact, it is
a (1, 1, O)-approximation). If instead the problem has a maximization objective, we may w.l.o.g.
set O = 0 in the implicit form we output, which means that the contribution of O is completely
ignored. So we can use the exact same approach as the wO ≥ 0 case and just set wO = 0.
So let A be the algorithm that runs G on every profile as described, and computes the implicit
form of this mechanism with respect to D′. A clearly terminates in the desired runtime. Finally,
to implement a mechanism whose implicit form ~πM0 matches A(~w), simply run G with the required
parameters on every profile.
✷
Proof of Proposition 6: By Proposition 4, the implicit form ~πI output by the linear program of
Figure 2 is in the convex hull of {AβS(~w1), . . . ,AβS(~wd+1)}. Therefore, the implicit form ~π′I =
(O/β, ~π, ~p) is in the convex hull of {A(~w1), . . . ,A(~wd+1)}. Therefore, we can implement ~π′I with
respect to D′ by randomly sampling a direction ~wj according to the convex combination, and then
implementing the corresponding A(~wj). Call this mechanism M . By Proposition 5, this can be
done time polynomial in the desired quantities. Finally, we just need to show that the guarantees
hold with the desired probability.
If our target was just an interim individually rational mechanism, it would be trivial to match
the prices exactly: just charge each bidder the desired prices. But if we want an ex-post IR
mechanism, we need to employ a simple reduction used in Appendix D of [22], which causes the
prices to possibly err with the rest of the implicit form. To see that all guarantees hold with the
desired probability, consider that the implicit form of M with respect to D is ǫ-close to ~π′I with the
desired probability. In the event that this happens, it’s obvious that the desired properties hold. ✷
B Omitted Proofs from Section 4
In this section we provide a proof of Theorems 6, 7, and 8. We begin with Theorem 6. Shmoys
and Tardos show that if the linear program of Figure 4 outputs a feasible fractional solution, then
it can be rounded to a feasible integral solution without much loss. We will refer to this linear
program as LP (t) for various values of t.
Theorem 11. ([44]) Any feasible solution to LP (t) can be rounded to a feasible integral solution
in polynomial time with makespan at most T + t and cost at most C.
With Theorem 11 in hand, we can now design a (1, 1/2)-approximation algorithm. Define Mˆ(·)
as the modified makespan of an assignment to be Mˆ(~x) = max{M(x), pij |xij > 0}. In other
words, Mˆ(~x) is the larger of the makespan and the processing time of the largest single job that
is fractionally assigned. Note that for any ~x ∈ {0, 1}km that M(~x) = Mˆ (~x). Now consider solving
LP (t) for all km possible values of t, and let ~x∗ denote the best solution among all feasible solutions
output. The following lemma states that ~x∗ performs better than the integral optimum.
Lemma 5. Let ~x∗ denote the best feasible solution output among all km instances of LP (t), and let
~y denote the integral solution minimizing makespan plus cost. Then Mˆ(~x∗)+C(~x∗) ≤M(~y)+C(~y).
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Variables:
• xij , for all machines i and jobs j denoting the fractional assignment of job j to machine i.
• T , denoting the maximum of the makespan and the processing time of the largest single job
used.
Constraints:
• ∑ki=1 xij = 1, for all j, guaranteeing that every job is assigned.
• ∑mj=1 pijxij ≤ T , for all i, guaranteeing that the makespan is at most T .
• xij ≥ 0, for all i, j.
• xij = 0 for all i, j such that pij > t, guaranteeing that no single job has processing time larger
than t.
• T ≥ t.
Minimizing:
• ∑i,j cijxij + T , (almost) the makespan plus cost of the fractional solution.
Figure 4: LP (t).
Proof. Some job assigned in ~y has the largest processing time, say it is t. Then ~y is a feasible solution
to LP (t), and will have value Mˆ(~y) + C(~y). ~x∗ therefore satisfies Mˆ(~x∗) + C(~x∗) ≤ Mˆ(~y) + C(~y).
As ~y is an integral solution, we have Mˆ(~y) =M(~y), proving the lemma.
Comining Lemma 5 with Theorem 11 proves Theorem 6.
Proof of Theorem 6: Consider the algorithm that solves LP (t) for all km values of t and outputs
the fractional solution ~x∗ that is optimal among all feasible solutions found. By Lemma 5, ~x∗ is at
least as good as the optimal integral solution. By Theorem 11, we can continue by rounding ~x∗ in
polynomial time to an integral solution ~x satisfying 12M(~x)+C(~x) ≤ Mˆ(~x∗)+C(~x∗) ≤M(~y)+C(~y).
✷
We next prove Theorem 8, as it will be used in the proof of Theorem 7.
Proof of Theorem 8: We can break the cost of ~x into C(~x) = C+(~x)+C−(~x), where C+(~x) denotes
the portion of the cost due to jobs assigned to machines with positive cost, and C−(~x) denotes the
portion of the cost due to jobs assigned to machines with negative cost. As ~v assigns all jobs to
the machine with largest positive cost, we clearly have C+(~v) ≥ C+(~x) and C−(~v) = 0 (but may
have F (~v) = 0). Furthermore, as E[yij] ≤ xij for all i, j, we clearly have C−(~y) ≥ C−(~x) (but may
have C+(~y) = 0).
So there are two cases to consider. Maybe βF (~x) + C−(~x) ≥ γ(βF (~x) + C(~x)). In this case,
we clearly have z · βF (~y) + C(~y) ≥ βF (~x) + C−(~x) ≥ γ(βF (~x) + C(~x)), and the first possibility
holds. The other case is that maybe C+(~x) ≥ (1− γ)(βF (~x)+C(~x)), in which case we clearly have
F (~v) + C(~v) ≥ C+(~x) ≥ (1− γ)(βF (~x) + C(~x)), and the second possibility holds. ✷
With Theorem 8, we may now prove Theorem 7. We begin by describing our algorithm modify-
ing that of Asadpour and Siberi, which starts by solving a linear program known as the configuration
LP. We modify the LP slightly to minimize fairness plus cost, but this does not affect the ability
to solve this LP in polynomial time via the same approach used by Bansal and Sviridenko [5].12
The modified configuration LP is in Figure 5. Note that T is a parameter, and for any T we call
12Note that this is non-trivial, as the LP has exponentially-many variables. The approach of Bansal and Sviridenko
is to solve the dual LP via a separation oracle which requires solving a knapsack problem.
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the instantiation of the configuration LP CLP (T ). A configuration is a set S of jobs. A config-
uration S is said to be “valid” for machine i if
∑
j∈S pij ≥ T , or if S contains a single job with
pij ≥ T/
√
k log3(k). Call the former types of configurations “small” and the latter “big.” S(i, T )
denotes the set of all configurations that are valid for machine i.
Variables:
• xi,S , for all machines i and configurations S denoting the fractional assignment of configura-
tion S to machine i.
Constraints:
• ∑S∈S(i,T ) xi,S = 1, for all i, guaranteeing that every machine is fractionally assigned a valid
configuration with weight 1.
• ∑i∑S|j∈S xi,S ≤ 1, for all j, guaranteeing that no job is fractionally assigned with weight
more than 1.
• xi,S ≥ 0, for all i, C.
Maximizing:
• ∑i∑S∈S(i,T ) xi,S∑j∈S cij, the cost of the fractional solution ~x.
Figure 5: (a modification of) The configuration LP parameterized by T .
Step one of the algorithm solves CLP (T ) for all T = 2x for which the fairness of the optimal
solution could possibly be between 2x and 2x+1. It’s clear that there are only polynomially many
(in the bit complexity of the processing times and k and m) such x. Let ~x(T ) denote the solution
found by solving CLP (T ) (if one was found at all). Then define ~x∗ = argmaxT {2T + C(~x(T ))}.
We first claim that ~x∗ is a good fractional solution.
Lemma 6. Let OPT be the fairness plus cost of the optimal integral allocation. Then 2F (~x∗) +
C(~x∗) ≥ OPT .
Proof. Whatever the optimal integral allocation, ~z is, it has some fairness F (~z). For T = 2x
satisfying F (~z) ∈ [T, 2T ), ~z is clearly a feasible solution to CLP (T ), and therefore we must have
C(~x(T )) ≥ C(~z). As we also clearly have 2T ≥ F (~z) by choice of T , we necessariliy have 2F (~x(T ))+
C(~x(T )) ≥ OPT . As ~x∗ maximizes 2F (~x(T )) +C(~x(T )) over all T , it satisfies the same inequality
as well.
From here, we will make use of Theorem 8: either we will choose the allocation ~v that assigns
every job to the machine with the highest non-negative cost, or we’ll round ~x∗ to ~y via the procedure
used in [3]. We first state the rounding algorithm of [3].
1. Make a bipartite graph with k nodes (one for each machine) on the left and m nodes (one for
each job) on the right.
2. For each machine i and job j, compute xij =
∑
S∋j xi,S . If pij ≥ T/
√
k log3 k, put an edge of
weight xij between machine i and job j. Call the resulting graph M.
3. For each node v, denote by mv the sum of weights of edges incident to v.
4. Update the weights in M to remove all cycles. This can be done without decreasing C(~x) or
changing mv for any v, and is proved in Lemma 7.
5. Pick a random matching M in M according to Algorithm 2 of [3]. Each edge (i, j) will
be included in M with probability exactly xij, and each machine i will be matched with
probability exactly mi.
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6. For all machines that were unmatched in M , select small configuration S with probability
xi,S/mi.
7. For all jobs that were selected both in the matching stage and the latter stage, award them
just to whatever machine received them in the matching. For all jobs that were selected
only in the latter stage, choose a machine uniformly at random among those who selected it.
Throw away all unselected jobs.
Before continuing, let’s prove that we can efficiently remove cycles without decreasing the cost
or changing any mv.
Lemma 7. Let M be a bipartite graph with an edge of weight xij between node i and node j, and
denote by mv the sum of weights of edges incident to v. Let also each edge have a cost, cij. Then
we can modify the weights of M in poly-time so that M is acyclic, without decreasing ∑i,j xijcij
or changing any mv.
Proof. Consider any cycle e1, . . . , e2x. For e = (i, j), denote by c(e) = cij and x(e) = xij . Call
the odd edges those with odd subscripts and the even edges those with even subscripts. W.l.o.g.
assume that the odd edges have higher total cost. That is,
∑x
z=1 c(e2z−1) ≥
∑x
z=1 c(e2z). Let also
ǫ = minz x(e2z). Now consider decreasing the weight of all even edges by ǫ and increasing the
weight of all odd edges by ǫ. Clearly, we have not decreased the cost. It is also clear that we have
not changed mv for any v. And finally, it is also clear that we’ve removed a cycle (by removing
an edge). So we can repeat this procedure a polynomial number of times and result in an acyclic
graph.
Now, let ~x denote the fractional assignment obtained after removing cycles in M. Then it’s
clear that 2F (~x) + C(~x) ≥ OPT . If we let ~y denote the randomized allocation output at the end
of the procedure, it’s also clear that E[yij] ≤ xij for all i, j. This is because if there were never
any conflicts (jobs being awarded multiple times), we would have exactly E[yij] = xij . But because
of potential conflicts, E[yij] can only decrease. Asadpour and Siberi show the following theorem
about the quality of ~y:
Theorem 12. ([3]) With probability 1− o(1), the fairness of the allocation output by the procedure
is at least F (~x)/320
√
k log3 k. This implies that F (~y) ∈ Ω˜(F (~x)/√k).
And now we are ready to make use of Theorem 8.
Proposition 8. Either assigning every job to the machine with highest cost is a (12 , 1)-approximation
(which is a traditional 12-approximation), or the ~y output by the algorithm above is a (
1
2 , O˜(
√
k))-
approximation.
Proof. After removing cycles, we have a fractional solution ~x that is a (1, 2)-approximation. By
using the randomized procedure of Asadpour and Siberi, we get a randomized ~y satisfying E[yij] ≤
xij for all i, j and O˜(
√
k)F (~y) ≥ F (~x). Therefore, taking γ = 1/2, Theorem 8 tells us that either
assigning every job to the machine with highest non-negative cost yields a 12 -approximation, or ~y
is a (12 , O˜(
√
k))-approximation.
We conclude this section by proving that the (m− k+1)-approximation algorithm of Bezakova
and Dani for fairness can be modified to be a (1,m− k + 1)-approximation for fairness plus costs.
The algorithm is fairly simple: for a fixed T , make the following bipartite graph. Put k nodes
on the left, one for each machine, and m nodes on the right, one for each job. Put an additional
m− k nodes on the left for dummy machines. Put an edge from every job node j to every dummy
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machine node of weight maxi{0, cij}, and an edge from every job node to every real machine node
i of weight cij only if pij ≥ T . Then find the maximum weight matching in this graph. For
every job that is matched to a real machine, assign it there. For every job that is assigned to
a dummy machine, assign it to the machine with the maximum non-negative cost (or nowhere if
they’re all negative). Call this assignment AT . Denote A
∗ = argmaxT {(m − k + 1)T + C(AT )}.
Finally, let V denote the allocation that just assigns every job to the machine of highest cost. If
F (V ) + C(V ) ≥ (m− k + 1)F (A∗) + C(A∗), output V . Otherwise, output A∗.
Proposition 9. The algorithm above finds an allocation A satisfying (m− k + 1)F (A) + C(A) ≥
OPT . That is, A is a (1,m− k + 1)-approximation.
Proof. Consider the optimal assignment X. We either have F (X) = 0, or F (X) > 0. If F (X) = 0,
then clearly X = V . If F (X) > 0, then every machine is awarded at least one job, but at most
m− k + 1. For each machine i, define j(i) to be the job assigned to i with the highest processing
time. Except for j(i), reassign all other jobs to the machine with the highest non-negative cost.
This can only increase the cost, and will not hurt the fairness by more than a factor of m− k + 1.
So this solution, X ′, clearly has (m−k+1)F (X ′)+C(X ′) ≥ OPT . Futhermore, X ′ corresponds to
a feasible matching when T = F (X ′). Whatever solution AT is found instead clearly has fairness
at least T and cost at least C(X ′). So AT , and therefore also A
∗, is a (1,m−k+1)-approximation.
So in conclusion, either F (X) > 0, in which case A∗ is a (1,m − k + 1)-approximation, or
F (X) = 0, in which case F (V )+C(V ) = OPT . So if we ever output V , we actually have V = OPT .
If we output A∗, then either F (X) > 0, or (m− k+1)F (A∗) +C(A∗) ≥ F (V ) +C(V ) = OPT . In
both cases, A∗ is a (1,m − k + 1)-approximation.
Proof of Theorem 7: Part 1) is proved in Proposition 8, and part 2) is proved in Proposition 9. ✷
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